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HOW DO 100% SMOKE-FREE BANS IN WORKPLACES, BARS, AND
RESTAURANTS AFFECT SMOKING BEHAVIOR?
ELIZABETH KATARINA VERMANN
ADVISOR: SARAH WEST
Abstract. Since 2001, the pervasiveness of 100% smoke-free bans has increased
dramatically, while the smoking rate among American adults has decreased
modestly. This study examines the effect of these bans in workplaces, bars,
and restaurants on changes in smoking behavior (initiation, prevalence, con-
tinuation, consumption, and cessation) using individual-level smoking data
from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey. Generally, this paper
finds that, relative to increases in cigarette taxes, bans are less successful in
changing smokers’ behavior. Nonetheless, results indicate that of the three
types of bans, those in restaurants are correlated with the largest likelihood of
behavioral change.
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I. Introduction
Each year in the United States, 20% of deaths can be attributed either directly or
indirectly to smoking. In fact, those who smoke are estimated to die 14 years earlier than
those who do not (Adhikari et al., 2008). As information about the health consequences of
smoking emerged in the 1960s, governments at all levels began regulating cigarettes through
higher taxes, advertising bans, and warning labels. The most recent trend in regulating
cigarette demand is the rise in 100% smoke-free bans in public and private spaces such
as bars and restaurants. These bans are intended to not only encourage cessation, stop
initiation, change public sentiment concerning smoking, and raise the opportunity cost of
smoking, much like a higher tax rate would, but to decrease nonsmokers’ exposure to second
hand smoke. Since the early 2000s, these bans have spread at a dramatic rate, growing from
32 local laws in 2001 to 308 by the end of 2009. At this rate, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) estimate that smoke-free indoor air laws will cover the entire U.S.
(CDC, 2011).
Though 100% smoke-free bar and restaurant bans are fairly new, economists have
studied how less severe bans in public places and workplaces have influenced smoking ini-
tiation and prevalence. Early literature – which controls for bans in examinations of tax
policy and youth smoking – estimates the effects of bans on cigarette demand using indices
that either take into account ban stringency (e.g. Czart et al., 2001; Sung et al., 1994;
Wasserman, 1991), probability of encountering a ban (Yurekli & Zhang, 2000), or a method
that combines these two factors (Chaloupka, 1992). These analyses indicate that bans have
robust, significant, and negative effects on smoking. For example, according to Yurekli and
Zhang (2000), clean indoor-air laws reduced cigarette consumption by 4.5%.
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The assumptions surrounding the construction of these indices, however, could have
skewed results in one of two ways. Studies that weight their indices based on the stringency of
policies assume the same marginal effects for all types of bans (DeCicca, Kenkel, & Mathios,
2008; Ross & Chaloupka, 2004). Additionally, these studies assume compliance with and
enforcement of partial legal restrictions. Yet, in an examination of state clean indoor air
laws and smoking-related outcomes among the US workers facing these laws on a regular
basis, Bitler, Carpenter, & Zavodny (2011) find that only bartenders reported increased
presence of bans at their workplace (bars). As such, they were the only workers in the
study to report statistically significant changes in their smoking habits. On the other hand,
studies with indices weighted based on the likelihood of encountering each specific type of
ban assume that all bans are created equal. Yet, it has been shown that individuals who
face comprehensive bans – bans that cover indoor and outdoor areas – are less likely to use
tobacco, but those with indoor-only bans do not exhibit significant changes in their tobacco
consumption (Knudsen, Boyd, & Studts, 2010; Raptou, Mattas, & Katrakilidis, 2009; Ross
& Chaloupka, 2004).
Another branch of smoking ban literature focuses on the introduction of bans in the
workplace. With the exception of Chaloupka and Saffer (1992), these studies estimate larger
changes in smoking demand than studies that use indices (e.g. Brownson, Hopkins, & Wake-
field, 2002; Farrelly, Evans, & Sfekas, 1999; Irvine & Nguyen, 2009). To illustrate, Farrelly,
Evans, and Sfekas (1999) find that 100% smoke-free workplace bans reduced smoking preva-
lence – the percentage of people who smoke – by 6% and average cigarette consumption by
14% among a cross-section of workers in the 1993 Current Population Survey. Experimental
studies, such as the difference-in-differences analysis of the effects of the implementation of
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full workplace smoking bans in Ontario, Canada highlighted in Carpenter (2007 and 2009),
find overall decreases in smoking and environmental tobacco smoke exposure among blue-
collar workers who had not encountered such policies in their workplaces prior to the laws.
The effects of the workplace bans are also estimated to have positive spillovers, implying
that restrictions on an individual’s smoking habits are likely to have a social multiplier,
causing smoking reductions among people who do not face bans at their workplaces (Cutler
& Glaeser, 2007). Nonetheless, many of the studies that examine the effects of workplace
bans do not control for the presence of other bans or for other aspects of tobacco control (e.g.
Irvine & Ngyuen, 2009; Evans, Farrelly, & Sfekas, 1999). In excluding tax rates and other
venue-specific restrictions, these studies may falsely attribute the effects of other policies to
work bans, overestimating the effect of such bans on smoking.
In examining the effects of 100% smoke-free bans in workplaces, bars and restaurants,
this paper addresses the limitations of previous literature in three ways. First, because all
of the bans examined here have the same level of stringency and I explicitly control for
bans in workplaces, restaurants, and bars. That way, this study overcomes the limitations
of the assumed ban homogeneity in the ban index literature. At the same time, this study
takes into account other aspects of tobacco control policy, such as taxes and state-level
funding. That way, this paper can assess the role smoking restrictions play within the
myriad of tobacco control policies. Finally, to my knowledge, the majority of the existing
literature examining smoking bans in the U.S. analyzes data collected prior to 2001. Since
2001, however, the number of 100% smoke-free laws in all workplaces, restaurants, and
bars increased dramatically from 32 local laws to 375 by the end of 2009 (Americans for
Nonsmokers’ Rights, 2010).
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In analyzing data from the CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey, this
study finds that county-level bans have statistically significant effects on smoking behav-
ior. These effects are largest for smoke-free bans in restaurants. Despite their statistical
significance, the results indicate that these non-price tobacco controls may not have an eco-
nomically significant impact on smoking behavior relative to price controls.
In section II of this paper, I exposit my theoretical approach. In Section III, I describe
the data and present summary statistics. Section IV explains the estimation strategy and
examines my empirical results. Finally, in Section V, I conclude by discussing the policy
implications of my findings and by considering further approaches to studying this topic.
II. Theory
To assess the effect of smoking bans on cigarette consumption, this paper uses a
utility-maximizing framework. This framework assumes smokers are rational and, thus,
respond to changes in prices (Becker & Murphy, 1988) as they maximize their intraday
utility (Irvine & Nguyen, 2009). Further, I assume that intraday utility (U) is a separate
function of the utility from cigarettes (f(c)) and the utility from all other goods (g(g))
following:
U = [f(c), g(g)] . (1)
This utility function is consistent with two-state budgeting: an individual first decides how
much income to allocate to cigarettes and other goods, then, within those categories, how
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much to spend on individual goods (Deaton & Muellbaur, 1980).1 As a result, utility can be
maximized for cigarette consumption alone, ignoring g.
When the government imposes a smoking ban, the real price of smoking changes.
Rather than make decisions on how much to smoke based on p1, a smoker must determine
his or her optimal level of cigarette consumption by considering the opportunity cost of
smoking in the presence of a ban (Irvine & Nguyen, 2009). For this reason, even if the
nominal price does not change, the real price of smoking may increase due to foregone wages
and convenience costs. To illustrate, if a smoker faces a workplace ban, part of the smoking
decision will also be based on the time cost of leaving his or her workspace to smoke. In
this case, a smoker would face an implicit loss in wages due to the time spent away from
working. If a smoker faces a ban in a restaurant or bar, part of the smoking decision will be
based on the awkwardness of excusing oneself from a social situation. In this situation, an
individual faces an additional convenience cost of smoking. I assume that perceived social
norms about smoking would also influence how an individual smoker internalizes the implicit
costs of smoking in an area with a ban. Hence, large-scale changes in public perception of
smoking – one of the goals of a smoking ban – would influence an individual’s decision to
smoke (Singleton, 2008; DeCicca et al., 2008; Kim & Shanahan, 2003).
To take into account the additional costs a smoker faces, the price of smoking in the
presence of a ban (pb) is greater than the price of smoking in the absence of one (pu):
pb > pu
pu = p1. (2)
1Clearly the allocation of spending on cigarettes and spending on other goods could be affected by a ban.
The predictions of this theory for empirical testing, however, are not affected by this assumption.
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Hence, a smoker’s budget constraint for cigarettes (Ic) when a ban is in effect takes into
account these prices, following:
Ic = pucu + pbcb, (3)
where cu represents the consumption of cigarettes in an area without a ban and cb represents
the consumption of cigarettes in an area with a ban. This equation implies that cigarettes
are no longer homogenous goods. Instead, individuals must allocate cu and cb to maximize








where µ1, µ2, and ρ are parameters. Equation (4) represents a nonlinear trade-off between the
number of cigarettes consumed in areas with and without bans. This utility function exhibits
constant elasticity of substitution (Varian, 1993). Maximization of the utility of smoking
subject to the budget constraint for smoking (Equation 3) occurs when the marginal rate of














Because cigarettes are addictive, this model is conditioned upon an individual’s level
of addiction (Irvine & Nguyen, 2009; Harris & Chan 1998), indicated by the magnitude of
ρ. This parameter dictates the substitutability of cigarettes in areas with and without bans
(Figure 1). For a light smoker, ρ = 1, giving his or her utility curve the form:
Uc = µ1cu + µ2cb. (6)
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In this case, banned and unbanned cigarettes are perfect substitutes. Consequently, as the
price of banned cigarettes increases, the smoker will consume all of his or her cigarettes in
areas without bans, implying that there will be no change in the individuals total number










For a heavy smoker, ρ→ −∞, making unbanned and banned cigarettes perfect complements.














This situation indicates that there is no substitution between cigarettes in banned and un-
banned areas. Therefore, heavy users will see a dramatic decrease in the total number of
cigarettes consumed.
Though this result seems counter-intuitive because heavier users would be more will-
ing to pay the higher price for smoking during banned times, literature indicates that heavier
smokers are more likely to compensate for fewer cigarettes by increasing their average intake
of nicotine per cigarette (Irvine & Nguyen, 2009; Adda & Cornaglia, 2006). For example,
Benowitz et al. (1986) find that heavy smokers (who smoke an average of 37 cigarettes per
day) that are limited to smoking only 5 cigarettes per day tripled their average intake of
nicotine per cigarette. Following this finding, Benowitz (2001) finds that heavy smokers will
decrease their cigarette consumption to the minimum amount necessary to maintain their
addiction (generally, around 10 cigarettes).
For other smokers, banned and unbanned cigarettes can be viewed as imperfect sub-
stitutes. Depending on one’s level of addiction, a smoker would want to keep a certain level
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of nicotine in their system during the day in order to avoid daily withdrawal symptoms
(Benowitz, 2001). For these smokers, −∞ < ρ < 1, so that their utility maximization de-
cision is characterized by Equation (5). Therefore, the changes in the consumption habits
of those with lower levels of addiction will more closely resemble individuals who consider
banned and unbanned cigarettes perfect substitutes, while the changes in the consumption
habits of those with higher levels of addiction will more closely resemble individuals who
consider banned and unbanned cigarettes perfect complements. Thus, rescheduling one’s
smoking routine is easier for light smokers than it is for heavy smokers, who require a higher
and more constant stream of nicotine throughout the day to avoid withdrawal. As such,
light smokers they will have little or no change in the number of cigarettes consumed each
day, while heavy smokers will have a more substantial change in the number of cigarettes
consumed.
III. Data Description and Summary Statistics
To estimate the effects of clean indoor air laws in bars and restaurants on smoking
behavior, it would be ideal to have panel data on individuals, their smoking habits (e.g.
how many cigarettes and how often), their level of addiction, the factors that influence the
individual’s smoking decision (e.g. smoking setting, number of friends who smoke), and
how often individuals encounter smoking bans. Such data would allow one to more accu-
rately track exposure to bans and identify subsequent changes in behavior. Unfortunately,
only cross-sectional data on individual smoking consumption exist so one cannot observe an
individual’s response to smoking bans over time.
8
To circumvent this problem, this paper uses repeated cross-sectional smoking infor-
mation from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (BRFSS),2 while controlling for
time and region fixed effects. 3 These data are merged with information on local, county,
and state smoking bans from the Americans for Nonsmoker’s Rights lobby,4 cigarette prices
from the Tax Burden on Tobacco,5 tobacco control data from ImpacTeen.org6 and alcohol
price data from the ACCRA cost of living index.7
Data Organization.
Smoking and Addiction. The BRFSS provides individual level health data for adults 18 years
or older. This survey, conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
via monthly phone interviews, is one of the main sources of data on smoking trends in the
U.S.. The sample used in this study contains 964,925 individuals between the ages 18 and
50 interviewed between January 1st , 2001 and December 31st, 2009. Geographic coverage
spans 2,367 counties in 49 states8 and Washington D.C..
To classify an individual’s smoking behavior, I use the responses to the survey’s core
tobacco use questions. Specifically, the survey determines if an individual has ever smoked by
asking whether he or she had smoked 100 cigarettes (5 packs) over his or her lifetime. Based
on the results of this question, I create a dummy variable – initiation – to track the number
2Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Survey
Data. Atlanta, Georgia: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 1990-2009.
3I define regions using the Census Regions found at US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/popest/
geographic/codes02.html
4Americans for Nonsmoker Rights (2010). Chronological table of U.S. population protected by 100%
smoke-free state or local laws [data file]. Retrieved on 2 Oct 2010 from: http://www.no--smoke.org/pdf/
EffectivePopulationList.pdf.
5Orzechowski & Walker (2008) The tax burden on tobacco [data file]. Vol 44. Arlington, VA. Retrieved from
http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/statesystem/TrendReport/TrendReports.aspx
6ImpacTeen (2010) Tobacco control policy and prevalence data: 1991-2008 [data file]. Retrieved from http:
//www.impacteen.org/tobaccodata.htm.
7The Council for Community and Economic Research (2010) Accra cost of living index [data file].
8The data exclude Alaska.
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of respondents who have smoked. To determine an individual’s current smoking status, the
survey asks all of those who claimed that had smoked 100 cigarettes in their lifetime if they
are current smokers. Based on the responses of these individuals, I create a dummy variable
for smoking prevalence – the number of smokers in the entire survey population – and a
dummy variable for continuation – the number of current smokers among those who had
those who had smoked 100 cigarettes over their lifetime. After determining an individual’s
current smoking status, the survey asks current smokers how often they smoke (daily or
occasionally) and whether they have attempted to quit in the past year. Hence, I create a
ranked variable from 0 to 2 to indicate smoking frequency where 0 indicates never and 2
indicates daily smoking. I also create a dummy variable (cessation) for attempting to quit.
Because this theoretical model implies that the effects of a smoking ban are conditional
on a smoker’s level of addition, I use a variety of demographic controles to proxy for ρ.
Specifically, I use the demographic information in the BRFSS to control for age, gender,
employment status, class of worker, income, marital status, and the presence of children
as literature has shown individuals of different demographics have different responses to
smoking policies (Dedobbeleer et al., 2004; Hersch, 2000; Dodgen, 2005; Cheng & Kenkel,
2010). Additionally, I control for the consumption of alcoholic beverages – another addictive
substance – in order to have an idea of both the likelihood of an individual encountering
a smoking ban in a bar and as a proxy for an individual’s propensity for addiction.9 To
categorize the drinking behaviors, the BRFSS asks whether each individual had consumed
an alcoholic beverage within the last month, and, if so, how many drinks, and finally, how
9According to the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (2007), between 80% and 95% of
alcoholics smoke cigarettes (National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 2007). Furthermore,
economic literature on alcohol and tobacco consumption, indicates that alcohol and tobacco are correlated
(DiFranza, 1990; Bask & Melkersson, 2004; Decker, 2000; Picone, Sloan, & Trogdon, 2004).
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often he or she drinks. Using this information, I create a dummy variable denoting whether
the individual consumes any alcohol.
Smoking Bans and Other Tobacco Policy Variables. The Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights
lobby provides data on the dates when 100% smoke-free workplace, bar, and restaurant ban
legislation were enacted. I merge these data with the individual data from the BRFSS using
county codes and interview dates. Using these data, I create dummy variables indicating the
presence of any ban in a county without a statewide ban and a dummy variable indicating
the presence a statewide ban.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate the trends in smoking behavior among the respondents
vis-a`-vis trends in ban presence. In all three of these figures, one can see a dramatic rise
in the percentage of respondents living in an area with a ban, but a fairly constant level of
initiation, prevalence, and cessation rates, as well as minimal fluctuations in the prevalence
of daily, occasional, and quitting smokers. In fact, the proportion of respondents facing a
ban rose from 10% in 2001 to 75% in 2009 (see Table 4). These descriptive results may
indicate that these bans have a minimal impact on the smoking behaviors examined.
To control for price, this paper uses data on the annual average statewide price per
pack of cigarettes from The Tax Burden on Tobacco. This nominal price includes any tax
paid. I adjust these nominal prices in two ways. First, to account for state-by-state variation
in price levels, I divide each by each state’s average annual cost of living using the ACCRA
cost of living index. Next, I divide by the consumer price index using 2009 as the base year
to get the real cost per pack.
To control for the level of anti-smoking sentiment in each state, I use the state’s
average annual tobacco control spending per capita provided by ImpacTeen. This variable
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was chosen as a proxy because a number of studies (e.g. Siegel & Biener, 2000; Liu & Tan,
2009; Hamilton, Biener, & Brenan, 2008; Marlow, 2007) find that the intensity of state
education and media campaigns (and other forms of tobacco control) is positively correlated
with the level of disapproval of smoking. Since ImpacTeen only provides data up to 2007,
the 2008 and 2009 tobacco control spending data come from a combination of data from the
CDC and from Tobacco Free Kids.10 Specifically, Tobacco Free Kids provides the annual
state and federal tobacco control spending. To get the per capita state spending, I subtract
the total federal spending from those data using information from the CDC and divide by
the U.S. Census Bureau’s population estimates for each state.11 Once all of the tobacco
control data are compiled, I adjust them using the ACCRA cost of living composite index
and the CPI to get the adjusted real annual per capita state tobacco control spending.
Finally, I add a control for alcohol price to further take into account the probability of
going to a bar and to control for the relationship between alcohol and tobacco consumption.
To control for alcohol price I aggregate the ACCRA cost of living data on beer prices for
each state over each quarter to get annual state alcohol prices. I then adjust them to get the
real price using the CPI. I choose to proxy for alcohol prices with beer prices both because I
assume one is more likely to consume beer over wine in a bar and because the data for wine
and liquor prices were unavailable after 2004.
Summary Statistics.
10Tobacco Free Kids. History of State Tobacco Control Spending. Retrieved from:
www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0209.pdf
11CDC. State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation System. Retrieved from
http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/statesystem/DetailedReport/DetailedReports.aspx
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Tables 1 and 2 present the summary statistics for the demographics of all respon-
dents, respondents not facing bans, and respondents facing bans, respectively. The compo-
sition of the sample is 60% women, 74% white respondents, 77% employed, 38% are single,
62% have children, and 59% drink. Overall, respondents ranged in age from 18 to 49 years
old, with a mean age of 37. This age distribution was heavily skewed towards individuals
over 30 years old, who represent nearly 75% of the entire sample. My data also appear to
oversample highly educated individuals, as nearly 40% are college graduates (Table 2).
From these data one can see that the individual demographics (Table 1) are largely
consistent regardless of the presence of a ban. There are differences in socioeconomic charac-
teristics between individuals living in areas with and without bans. Generally, those facing
bans are more likely to have a college degree and earn over $75,000 per year. Further, they
are also more likely to live in the New England, the Mountain division and the Pacific divi-
sion, while those living in counties without bans are more likely to live in the South. These
differences in socioeconomic status and region could reflect differences in smoking culture
and attitudes.
Tables 3 and 4 describes the differences in smoking behavior and tobacco control
policies for respondents in the sample. Overall, 42% of respondents have smoked, 24% are
current smokers, and 18% are former smokers. Of the current smokers (56% of those who
have ever smoked), 42% smoke daily and 57% attempted to quit within the last year. Between
32% and 42% of all individuals in the sample live in an area with a smoking ban. Of all
types of bans, they are most likely to encounter a statewide smoking ban in restaurants and
the least likely to encounter a countywide bar ban. Across areas that have enacted smoking
bans, there is very little difference in smoking behavior. With the exception of current,
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daily smokers, who are 7% more likely to live in an area without a ban and former smokers
who are 7% more likely to live in an area with a ban, there is at most a 5% difference in
smoking behaviors across individuals living in areas with and without bans. In comparing
the adjusted state level tobacco price data a pack of cigarettes in an area with a ban costs
an average of $0.25 (5.8%) more than in an area without a ban. The minimum value for
cigarette price ($3.00), however, occurs in an area with a ban, while the maximum value
($7.21) occurs in both an area with a ban and an area without one. The price ranges are
also similar, falling between $3.21 and $7.21 in areas without bans and between $3.00 to
$7.21 in areas with bans.
Interestingly, states without bans on average spend $0.11 (4.1%) more per capita
on tobacco control than do those with bans. There is, however, no difference in spending
range for states with and without bans: both types of states spend between $0 and $16.32
per capita on tobacco control. Issues in alcohol price difference are also important to note
because, on average, price of alcohol is $0.74 (11.0%) lower in areas with bans than in areas
with bans. Nonetheless, the spread of the prices in banned and unbanned areas – $7.11 to
$9.52 and $7.39 to $10.00, respectively – is similar.
Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 compare the demographics of respondents who have never
smoked, are current daily smokers, are current occasional smokers, and are former smokers.
In comparing these groups, one can see that current daily smokers have the lowest levels of
educational attainment and income, with 54% of respondents with a high school diploma or
less and 37% earning less than $25,000 per year. In contrast, 46% of those who have never
smoked have at least a college degree and 53% earn more than $50,000 annually. The typical
occasional smoker group is the youngest, most likely to be non-white, and most likely to drink
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of all the groups examined (Table 5). A typical former smoker is more likely to be white,
older, have a child, and have a higher level of income than the other groups (Tables 7 and 8).
In comparing individuals who have and have not attempted to quit smoking in the past year
(Table 7 and 8), those who have not attempted to quit are more likely to be white, are nearly
2 years older on average, and more likely to have a higher level of education than those who
have attempted to quit. Overall, with the exception of socioeconomic characteristics, there
are not large discrepancies in demographics across the different categories of smoker
IV. Analysis
The effects of 100% smoke-free bans in workplaces, bars, and restaurants on smoking
behavior were estimated following:
Sit = α + β1Zit + β2Eit + β3Dit + β4Pit + β5Ait + β6Fit−4








• Subscripts i and t represent the respondent and survey year, respectively.
• S represents the smoking behavior examined. Those behaviors are initiation, preva-
lence, continuation, frequency, and cessation.
• Z represents the vector of demographic controls consisting of age, age squared, sex,
race, martial status, child present, income level, and educational attainment.
• E represents a dummy variable for employment.
• D represents a dummy variable for whether the respondent drinks.
• P represents the cigarette price.
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• A represents the alcohol price.
• F represents the log of per capita state tobacco control funding. This variable has
been lagged one year to take into account both the results of funding for programs
enacted in the previous year (assuming individuals will experience those programs at
time t) and to avoid possible endogeneity.
• B represents the vector of various county- and state- level bans the respondent may
encounter. These variables have been lagged one quarter to avoid possible endogene-
ity issues,12 as I assume bans precede changes in an individual’s smoking behavior.13
• E∗B and D∗B represent the interaction terms between the indicators of employment
and work ban presence, and between drinking and bar ban presence, respectively.
These terms control for the probability of a respondent encountering either a work
or bar ban. It is important to note that the bans in the interaction terms have not
been lagged.
• R and T represent the region and time fixed effects, respectively.
A number of models could be used to estimate this equation using synthetic panel data
with a dummy dependent variable.14 This paper uses a probit because such a model is robust
to the presence of time invariant variables (Gallet et al., 2006) and a number of regressors
in this model vary across space but not time. All of the regressions of smoking behaviors
12The literature on tobacco control debates whether endogeneity is an issue within individual-level data. On
one hand, evidence suggests that states adopting 100% smoke-free bans are likely to have lower smoking
rates and more tobacco control policies (Dunham & Marlow, 2000; Boyes & Marlow, 1996; Smetters &
Gravelle, 2001). On the other hand, Chaloupka (1992) and Wasserman et al. (1991) argue that when using
individual-level data to estimate cigarette demand, endogeneity is not a problem because the presence of
clean indoor air laws is more closely related to average statewide cigarette consumption. In other words,
a single individual’s decision to smoke will not factor into a legislator’s decision to enact more stringent
tobacco control policies, but the decisions a group of individuals will.
13This method has been used by Chaloupka (1992) and Picone, Sloan, & Trogdon (2004).
14Such models include the linear probability model, logits, and tobits.
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were estimated using a binomial probit regression except for the regression involving smoking
frequency. To estimate the correlation between smoking bans and smoking frequency, I used
an ordered probit.
The main coefficients of interest from these estimates are those on the ban variables
(β7), interaction terms (β8 and β9), and cigarette price (β4). Of these coefficients, β7 repre-
sents the overall influence of a ban on the probability of all respondents exhibiting a certain
smoking behavior, while β7 + β8 or β7 + β9 represent the overall influence of a ban on the
smoking behaviors of individuals encountering the ban. Thus, β7 + β8 + β9 represent the
overall influence of bans on a given smoking behavior if all three types of ans are present.
Given these coefficients, I expect β7 not to equal 0 and β8, β9 and β4, to be less than zero.
15
Results.
Tables 9 through 20 present the estimated coefficients on smoking bans and tobacco
policy controls from the probit regressions of smoking initiation (column I), prevalence (col-
umn II), continuation (column III), and cessation (column V), as well as the results from the
ordered probit regression on frequency (column IV), while Table 10 presents the estimated
coefficient for the demographic control variables from these regressions. The coefficients for
the estimates on all dependent variables except smoking frequency have been normalized to
measure the marginal effect of each variable on the individual’s smoking behavior. As such,
one can interpret the coefficients as the change in the probability of the individual’s smoking
behavior, given his or her demographic characteristics and the set of tobacco control policies
he or she faces.
15I expect the opposite for the specifications where attempt to quit is the dependent variable because I
assume bans would be positively correlated with a smoker’s attempt to stop smoking.
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Table 9 presents the results for the core regression, in which I explicitly control for
each type of county- and state- level ban. The remaining Tables contain various robustness
checks.
Bans. Table 9 indicates that the overall effects of smoking bans on smoking initiation, preva-
lence, continuing to smoke, smoking frequency, and attempting to quit are negligible – es-
pecially the effects of county-level bans. To illustrate, county-level bans are correlated with
a 0.8% decrease in smoking prevalence and a 1.5% increase in the probability of individuals
continuing to smoker, holding demographics constant. For the employed, drinking individ-
uals, county-level bans make them no are no more likely to have ever smoked and make
smokers 2.2% less prevalent, more likely to smoker less, and 1.8% more likely to have quit
successfully. Implementation of these bans, however, has no statistically significant effect on
attempting to quit. State-level bans, on the other hand, are associated with slightly larger
overall changes in behavior. Bans at this level are correlated with a 0.5% decrease in the
initiation rate, a 0.3% increase in the prevalence rate, a 1.7% increase in smokers continuing
to smoke, a 0.8% decrease in the likelihood of smokers attempting to quit, and an increase
in smoking frequency. In areas with state-level bans, smokers who are employed and drink
are 1.1% less prevalent, 1.6% more likely to have quit successfully, and slightly less likely to
smoke everyday. Nonetheless, they are 0.8% less likely to attempt to quit smoking.
Though the magnitudes of the overall effects of county-level bans are higher than those
on state-level bans, only county-level restaurant bans (column II) and bar bans (column III)
are statistically significant, whereas all three state-level bans are consistently statistically
significant. The overall lack of statistical significance on coefficients for individual county-
level bans may indicate that county-level bans may be less effective at changing the behaviors
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of smokers. In other words, imposing a county-level ban on smokers may not change their
behaviors. Such a ban may, instead, encourage them to smoke elsewhere. Thus, the minimal
estimated effects of county-level bans may be due to the ability of smokers to avoid such bans
by working, drinking, or eating out in a neighboring county without smoking restrictions.16
The differential effects of county-level and state-level bans could also indicate prob-
lems with endogeneity. Generally, these small overall effects of state-level bans are driven
by either the presence of large, positive coefficients on the work and bar ban variables. For
example, individuals facing a statewide 100% smoke-free workplace ban are 2.2% more likely
to be smokers. The magnitude of this positive coefficient overpowers the magnitude of the
negative coefficient on the interaction term, which indicates that workers facing a workplace
ban are 1.2% less likely to smoke. The positive coefficients on state-level bans suggest that
state-level bans are implemented in areas where there are more smokers, indicating that bans
are endogenous: areas with higher numbers of smokers are more likely to impose bans in
the first place. Hence, the lack of statistical significance on for the estimated coefficients on
the county-level bans indicates that these bans are more likely to be exogenous. Therefore,
the interaction terms may indicate the actual overall effect of these bans on the smoking
behaviors of individuals who encounter them.
Interestingly, of the three types of bans controlled for in this specification, the esti-
mated coefficients on restaurant bans were the highest, as they were correlated with at least
a 0.8% likelihood of behavioral change for a county-level ban and a 1.9% likelihood of change
for a state-level ban. This finding is likely because there is no interaction term to control
for whether individuals encounter these bans.17 By excluding such an interaction term, the
16In fact, Adams and Cotti (2008) find evidence for smokers traveling across county lines to avoid restrictions
in bars.
17The results in Tables 14 and 15 examine this possibility.
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coefficients on county- and state-level restaurant bans may be overestimated because the
specification assumes everyone in an area with a restaurant ban is eating out and encoun-
tering the ban. County-level 100% smoke-free bans in workplaces are estimated to have the
least effect, as the effects of these bans on smoking behavior are not statistically different
from 0. In terms of the behaviors, estimated coefficients on bans on both the county- and
state-level are smallest when looking at smoking initiation and cessation.
Price Controls. The estimated coefficients on a 1-percent increase in the price of cigarettes in
the core regression (Table 9) fall between 1.5% and 8.6%, have the expected negative signs,
and are all statistically significant. For all of the dependent variables except for smoking
initiation, the estimates on this price control – which represents the state average price per
pack of cigarettes, including the tax – are at least approximately 4 times larger than the
estimated total effects of the bans. These findings imply that price controls have a larger
negative effect on smokers’ behaviors than do non-price controls. To illustrate, the regression
results indicate that bans are correlated with a 0.8% decrease in the likelihood of a current
smoker attempting to quit. At the same time, an increase in the price of a pack of cigarettes
is correlated with a 8.6% increase in the likelihood of an individual attempting to quit.
For the estimated effects on the likelihood of an individual having smoked, the coeffi-
cients on bans (-1.5% at the state-level) and cigarette prices (-1.4%) are similar. This finding
may indicate that other factors (such as the number of friends who smoke) may outweigh
price in the decision to begin smoking. At the same time, this finding could indicate that
both prices and bans are equal barriers in stopping people from smoking. A high cost per
pack of cigarettes may deter people from beginning to smoke because they simply cannot
afford it, while a high presence of smoking bans may discourage individuals from smoking
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because these bans make it less acceptable and more difficult to smoke in public places.
Consequently, these bans could decrease the appeal of smoking.
Unlike the coefficients on cigarette price, the state tobacco control funding variable
consistently lacks statistical significance and has extremely small coefficients. This finding
indicates that the marginal effect of a one-dollar increase in state tobacco control funding
per capita is not correlated with either a statistically or economically significant change in
smoking behavior.
The final price control in the regression is alcohol prices. The coefficients on this
control tend to be relatively large in magnitude across all dependent variables except smoking
prevalence. Specifically, the estimates indicate that the marginal effect of a 1-percent increase
in alcohol prices falls between 1.0% (smoking prevalence) and 6.6% (smoking initiation).
Interestingly, the signs on the coefficient for alcohol prices changes depending on the dummy
variable estimated. For smoking initiation and prevalence, the coefficients are negative.
This result indicates that increases in the alcohol price decrease the number of people who
have ever smoked and the number of people who currently smoke in the sample population.
Hence, for the sample population, alcohol and cigarettes are substitutes. For the portion of
the sample who has smoked before, an increase in the price of alcohol is associated with a
4.1% increase in the likelihood of being a current smoker, an increase in smoking frequency,
and a 5.4% decrease in the likelihood of attempting to quit. Therefore, for individuals who
do smoke, alcohol and cigarettes are complementary goods.
Demographic Controls. Across all of the regressions and specifications, the coefficients on
all of the demographic and price controls are stable and (generally) statistically significant.
These coefficients are displayed in table 10 and indicate the changes in the probability of
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a respondent exhibiting the examined smoking behavior relative to the reference – a white,
married, unemployed, childless male who does not drink, have a high school degree, earn
more than $10,000 each year or live in an area with a ban.
When looking at the entire sample population (e.g. the smoking initiation and smok-
ing prevalence variables), a number of trends emerge. Women are less likely to have smoked
and to currently smoke than men. Across races, African-Americans and Hispanics are less
likely than whites to start smoking, but African Americans tend to have a higher level of
smoking prevalence. Across incomes, one can see that individuals in higher income groups
are increasingly less likely to have ever smoked and currently smoke. To illustrate, those
who make more than $20,000 a year are 2% less likely to smoke, while those making over
$75,000 a year are 15% less likely to smoke relative to the reference. These trends are sta-
tistically significant. Similarly, individuals with higher levels of educational attainment are
increasingly less likely to have smoked and to currently smoke. For example, high school
graduates are 9% less likely to smoke relative to non-graduate and college graduates are 32%
less likely to smoke relative to a high school dropout. Being single, older and a “drinker”
increase the likelihood of an individual having smoked by 2%, 4%, and 14% respectively,
while having a child decreases this likelihood by 2%. These same characteristics increase
smoking prevalence by 2%, 6%, and 10%, respectively, while having a child also decreases
this likelihood by 2%.
In the regressions examining the population of the sample who has smoked, similar
trends across income and educational attainment emerge. For example, individuals who earn
between $25,000 and $35,000 per year are 3% less likely to be current smokers, while those
who earn over $75,000 per year are 21% less likely to be current smokers relative to the
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reference. At the same time, wealthier smokers are more likely to smoke less than poorer
smokers. In contrast, wealthier smokers are less likely to attempt to quit smoking than poorer
smokers. These finding could imply that wealthier smokers are less price sensitive than poorer
smokers. With the exception of the likelihood of being a current smoker, individuals with
higher levels of educational attainment who have smoked are less likely to be current smokers,
more likely to smoke less frequently, and more likely to attempt to quit.
In the regression of smoking continuation, however, those with high school diplomas
and some college are 8% more likely to have successfully quit than those without a high school
degree, while those with some college are 1% more likely, and those with a college degree are
28% more likely. The decreased likelihood of successfully quitting among those with some
college could be because of differences in discount rates among these individuals. In other
words, completing only some college could indicate issues with commitment or indicate the
valuation of the current period over future periods.
In terms of demographics, within the population of individuals who have smoked,
women are more likely to be current smokers and smoke more frequently than men. At the
same time, they are more likely to attempt to quit than men. This finding could be due
to issues with child bearing. Finally, in terms of race, results for the regressions among
the smoking population indicate that nonwhites are less likely to smoke as frequently as
whites and are more likely than whites to attempt to quit smoking. At the same time,
African-American and Hispanic smokers are less likely to quit successfully.
Because the data oversample those over 30, college graduates, and those earning over
$50,000 per year, I further examine the effects of bans on 9 subpopulations: respondents aged
18-30, 30-40, and over 40, respondents with an annual income less than $25,000, between
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$25,000 and $75,000, and over $75,000, and respondents at each level of educational attain-
ment. The estimated coefficients for the highest and lowest income subpopulations differed
most from those in the original regression in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.
Generally, for each of these groups, the estimated coefficients on the ban variables were
smaller and became statistically insignificant. The exception to this trend is the coefficient
on the interaction term for employment and a work ban, which was larger in magnitude and
statistically significant for those earning less than $25,000/year. This result could indicate
the effects of expanding smoke-free workplace policies to a new class of worker, supporting
the findings of Carpenter (2007) and Carpenter (2009). Within the various age and educa-
tional attainment groups, there was little change in the estimated coefficients. The statistical
significance of the coefficients on all bans, however, largely disappeared for those aged 18-30
and those with less than a high school degree.18
Robustness Checks.
To assess the robustness of my results, I run four different checks: two which correct
for potential multicollinearity issues in the core regression (Tables 12 and 13, one that further
controls for ban prevalence(Table 14), and one which combines these approaches (Table 15).
I then run all of the regressions again with state fixed effects to correct for endogeneity
(Tables 16 through 20).
Multicollinearity Checks. As indicated by the pairwise correlation coefficients in Table 11,
there is a high level of multicollinearity between the three types of bans, especially bar and
restaurant bans. To illustrate, individuals who experience any 100% smoke-free bans are
between 67% and 83% more likely to experience another ban. Bans at the same level (e.g.
18For these results, contact the author.
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county or state) have correlation coefficients between 0.60 and 0.88, of which the highest
correlations occur between restaurant and bar bans.
The results in Table 12 address the multicollinearity between bans by combining bar
and restaurant bans. Specifically, I use a dummy variable to indicate whether a county has
either a restaurant or bar ban and one to indicate whether a state has either a restaurant
or bar ban. I also replace the previous interaction term for bar bans and drinking with an
interaction term for either a bar or restaurant ban and drinking. When running regressions
with this variable, the estimated marginal effects for bar/restaurant bans are negative and
statistically significant in the initiation and prevalence regressions for county-level bans.
Hence, county-level bans are correlated with a 0.9% decrease in smoking initiation and a
1.0% decrease in smoking prevalence. For state-level bans, all regressions except for cessation
have negative and statistically significant estimates for bar/restaurant bans, ranging from
-2.5% to -3.8%. Because the estimates for state-level smoke-free work bans remain positive
and statistically significant, state level bans have marginal effects falling between -2.5% and
1.0%.
For individuals who are employed and drink, the estimated overall coefficients on the
ban variables in this specification generally remain small and negative, ranging from -0.4%
to -3.1% for county-level bans and -0.7% to -1.6% for state-level bans. These estimates are
similar to the estimated total effects from the core regression. The overall estimated marginal
effects for the bar and restaurant smoke-free ban variables, however, are consistently negative
and larger in magnitude than the sum of the coefficients on bars and restaurants in the core
regression. The reason the overall effects are similar is because of the interaction term. The
combined bar/restaurant ban interaction term with drinking status is large, positive, and
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statistically significant across all dependent variables in this specification of the model. This
finding may be because the interaction term overestimates the number of people encountering
bar bans. This positive coefficient may also have occurred because the interaction term is
picking up on positive correlation of state-level restaurant bans and the various smoking
behaviors, as shown in Table 9.
Despite the differences in the estimated coefficients on the bar and restaurant ban
variables, the rest of the coefficients are robust to changes in specification. In fact, all of
the work ban and price control coefficients are within 0.5% of those in the core regression.
This finding indicates that multicollinearity does not affect the estimates for tobacco policy
controls. Also, the results of this specification indicate that state tobacco control funding
is statistically significant in estimates of smoking initiation and attempts to quit. Hence, a
1-percent increase in per capita tobacco control spending is correlated with a 0.3% increase
in the likelihood that an individual has smoked and a 0.4% decrease in the likelihood that
an individual has attempted to quit smoking in the past year. These correlations indicate
that state tobacco control policies are endogenous.
The specification in Table 13 address the problem of overestimating the combined
effects of bans in specification II and the potential multicollinearity problems due to the high
correlations between restaurant and bar bans by explicitly controlling for each combination of
bans an individual in my sample could encounter. In other words, I create a dummy variables
for all combinations of smoke-free workplace, bar, and restaurant bans at the county- and
state-level. The coefficients for the interaction terms and each individual ban are robust to
this change in specification except for the coefficients on state work and restaurant bans.
For both of these state-level bans, the magnitudes on the coefficients are larger. In addition,
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the state work bans became negative and statistically significant. In this regression, the
estimated overall effects of all three types of bans on the county- and state- level are also
consistent with those from the core regression.
When looking beyond the estimated effects of individual bans to those of combina-
tions of various bans, three major trends emerge. First, in examining pairs of bans, the
estimated effects are similar to those in the core regression. Further, the estimates tend
to be statistically significant if there is a state-level ban involved. The combinations of all
three bans, however, tend to lack statistical significance in the regressions with continua-
tion and frequency. In other words, facing all three types of bans at varying levels is not
correlated with a statistically significant likelihood of behavioral change for smokers. This
finding could be the result of sample issues, as smaller portions of individuals facing bans
in these combinations of varying county- and state-level bans. Alternatively, this finding
could indicate that bans have diminishing marginal effects. Thus, the first ban enacted may
cause smokers to change their behavior, but once another ban is imposed, they are less likely
to adjust their behavior. The second trend to emerge is the consistently larger estimated
effect of state-level restaurant bans on smoking behavior. Imposing a state-restaurant ban is
correlated with at least a 3.3% likelihood of behavioral change. Further, the combinations of
bans which include state restaurant bans tend to have larger estimated effects. This finding
could be due to the fact that I do not control for the likelihood of encountering one of these
bans. Finally, the estimated effect of a 1-percent increase in the cigarette price on smoking
behavior remains consistently larger than the estimated effects of bans.
27
Ban Prevalence. Because the core regression assumes that all individuals encounter restau-
rant bans, I control for the number of bars and restaurants per capita. (table 14)19 These
per capita variables were constructed by taking the log of the total number of bars and
restaurants in each county divided by thousands of residents in the county. I also inter-
act the logged per capita establishments with their respective bans. For per capita bars,
this creates a triple interaction tern between ban presence, drinking behavior, and drinking
establishments.
The results in table 14 are largely robust to the inclusion of per capita bar and restau-
rant controls. Indeed, the coefficients on work bans, bar bans, and the interaction between
employment and a work ban are the same as those in the core regression. Unexpectedly, the
coefficients for county and state restaurant bans increased in magnitude, indicating that after
controlling for how likely an individual is to encounter a restaurant ban, these bans are even
more effective at changing smokers’ behaviors. Nonetheless, the estimated coefficients still
remain negative and statistically significant. Further, their magnitudes still remain larger
than those for bar and work bans. For example, a state restaurant ban is correlated with a
4.1% decrease in the likelihood of a respondent being a current smoker, while a state work
and bar bans are correlated with 2.1% and 1.4% increases in the probability of a respondent
being a current smoker, respectively.
Overall, the interaction terms containing per capita establishments indicate that the
higher the number of establishments per capita, the greater the probability of a respondent
smoking less and quitting successfully. Hence, for individuals who drink, the total effects
of a one-percent increase in bars per capita results in at least a 4.0% change in smoking
19These data come from the County Business Patterns: http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/download/index.
htm.
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behavior when facing a county-level bar ban and a 0.8% change when facing a state-level
ban. An increase in restaurants per capita in an area with a county-level ban correlates with
between a 0.2% and 2.6% change in behavior, and between 0.8% and 1.8% for a state-level
ban. The signs on the interaction terms and per capita establishment variables, however,
indicate that bar and restaurant bans may work differently. For bars, the number of bars per
capita is negatively associated with changes in smoking behavior, while the interaction term
is positively associated with changes in smoking behavior. Hence, areas with higher levels of
bars per capita have higher levels of smoking, and respondents living in these areas are more
likely to smoke and more likely to smoke more frequently. At the same time, individuals
who drink are much less likely to smoke and to smoke frequently if there is a ban and an
increase in the number of bars per capita. The opposite is true for those facing restaurant
bans. Nonetheless, the overall effect of enacting a smoking ban in either a bar or restaurant
is negative for regressions of smoking initiation, prevalence, continuation, and frequency.
Table 15 controls for each combination of bans an individual could encounter and
establishments per capita, combining specification III and IV. In this specification, the co-
efficients are consistent with those of previous regressions. Thus, including a control for
restaurants per capita increases the magnitude of the coefficients for county and state restau-
rant bans, as well as the magnitudes for combinations of bans that include restaurants. As
a result, combinations of bans that include restaurants become statistically significant. At
the same time, the coefficients for per capita establishments and the interaction terms which
include per capita measures are robust to the redefinition of the ban variables. Thus, con-
trolling for the number of restaurants indicates an increase in the efficacy of bans in changing
smokers’ behaviors.
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Interestingly, when controlling for different ban combinations and per capita estab-
lishments, the coefficients for individuals facing any county bans at the county-level are
statistically significant and negative, except for those facing all three types of bans at differ-
ent levels. All three bans bans at the state-level only have statistically significant correlations
with initiation and prevalence. This difference from the rest of the specifications could in-
dicate that bans have a diminishing marginal effect on changing the behavior of those who
have smoked. This implies that, once acclimated to facing more restrictions on where to
smoke, smokers may not perceive additional the additional opportunity costs that new bans
impose. The results for this specification, however, need to be interpreted with caution be-
cause such low percentages of the sample actually face the various combinations of bans at
different levels.
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A Further Examination of Endogeneity.
Because of the positive coefficients on many of the state level bans and the small
magnitudes on county level bans, I further examine whether endogeneity was a factor in
these estimates by running all of my regressions with state fixed effects (Tables 16 through
20).20 This method is stronger than simply using regional fixed effects because it controls
for time-invariant characteristics in each state (Farrelly et al., 2001). Taken in conjunction
with controls for time fixed effects, the inclusions of state fixed effects would control for
cultural/regional and temporal variation in smoking attitudes.21
Across all of the models and specifications, the inclusion of state fixed effects gener-
ally decreases the magnitudes of the state-level ban and policy coefficients. In most cases,
these smaller magnitudes result in a loss of statistical significance for the ban coefficients.
Consequently, the state fixed effects regressions estimate smaller overall marginal effects of
smoking bans on smoking behavior. The main exceptions to this trend are the coefficients
on state-level bar bans in the initiation and prevalence models (Tables 16), where the bans
are correlated with statistically significant negative decreases the number of people who have
smoked and are current smokers within the sample population. Additionally, restaurant bans
have a negative, statistically significant correlation with initiation and prevalence. In the
estimates of continuation and smoking frequency, combinations of bar and restaurant bans
tend to have negative, statistically significant correlations with these smoking behaviors.
Though the coefficients on the ban variables are not robust to inclusion of state fixed
effects, the estimated marginal effects on the interaction terms for models are robust. From
20These tables report the coefficients for the tobacco policy variables. Despite using state fixed effects, the
coefficients on the demographic control variables remained the same as with regional fixed effects.
21Because of the severe multicollinearity issues between all of the endogenous variables, a more aggressive
method – namely a 2SLS probit regression – would not be possible because the estimates could not converge.
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these findings, one can conclude that imposing 100% smoke-free bans in workplaces and bars
can change the smoking behaviors of employees and patrons by up to 3.6%. This change
in behavior, however, is still much smaller than the change in behavior associated with an
increase in the price of cigarettes (up to 7.9%). For regressions controlling for bars and
restaurants per capita, however, the estimated effects of bans on smoking continuation are
larger than those for cigarette price (-10.6% vs. -6.4% in Table 19 and -9.7% vs. -6.4% in
Table 20).
V. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
This study examines the effect of 100% smoke-free bans in workplaces, bars, and
restaurants on smoking initiation, prevalence, cessation, and frequency using both regional
and state fixed effects. Generally, this paper finds that these bans exert little influence on
smoking behavior. Depending on the specification, the magnitudes and the directions on the
coefficients on the variables marking the presence of bans change. These changes were largely
driven by problems endogeneity. When correcting for this issue using state fixed effects, the
estimated marginal effects on smoking behavior for those encountering bans were robust.
Nonetheless, the estimated effects of bans on the smoking behavior of those employed and
those who drink were minimal, except in regressions controlling for bars and restaurants per
capita. Despite these estimation issues, the results indicate that smokers react to bans in
workplaces, less than those in restaurants and bars, supporting the notion that these factors
need to be controlled for separately in future studies.
Three main policy implications emerge from my results. First, the results of this
paper imply that increasing cigarette taxes is more effective in changing smoking behavior
than implementing a ban or increasing the amount of per capita tobacco control funding.
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In the majority of the estimates, the magnitude of an increase in cigarette prices are larger
and of greater statistical significance than any of the magnitudes for an individual ban or
the aggregate effect of all three types of ban. Hence, it appears that increasing taxes is the
best policy in terms of minimizing the number of smokers. This finding is especially true in
analyses of current smokers and their attempts to quit smoking. In all models of smoking
cessation attempts, the ban variables are not statistically or economically significant, but
the price variables are.
Second, in comparing county- and state level bans both before and after controlling
for state fixed effects, the estimated effects of county bans are higher than those of state
bans for individuals who encounter the bans. These results are consistent regardless of
whether one controls for per capita establishments. This finding may imply that bans have
diminishing marginal effects on smokers. Hence, as bans become more stringent – moving
from the county to state level – smokers will not change their behavior proportionally.
Finally, this paper finds that estimates on restaurant bans have the highest magni-
tudes and those on workplace bans have the smallest. This finding is robust to controlling
for the number of restaurants per capita and state fixed effects. Furthermore, in regressions
controlling for the various combinations of smoking bans, the marginal effects of an individ-
ual restaurant ban are at times larger than those for different ban combinations. This finding
implies that imposing bans in areas where individuals choose to go may have a larger effect
than imposing bans on areas where their activities may already be limited (i.e. at work).
Though the effects of bans on smokers tend to be small relative to changes in price
controls, one cannot rule out the benefits of these bans in terms of limiting individuals’
exposure to secondhand smoke. In fact, previous studies find that smoking bans do not
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have significant effects on smoker, but do decrease the amount of second hand smoke in
workplaces, bars, and restaurants (Carpenter, 2009; Carpenter, Postolek, & Warman, 2010)
and the number of smoking-related hospital admissions (Juster et al., 2007). Consequently,
there are social welfare benefits in enacting 100% smoke-free bans.
To further examine the role 100% smoke-free laws play in the spectrum of tobacco
control, further research is necessary. This study does not control for the presence of less
smoking restrictions before the passage of these bans. In some regions, these bans may not
have exogenously arisen; they may have simply amplified existing policies. Additionally,
it is likely that because the data on bans this paper are only on 100% smoke-free bans,
individuals who have been characterized as not facing bans may actually be facing other
smoking restrictions.
Additionally, future research that takes into account the likelihood of commuting to
an area without a ban would improve the accuracy of the estimates. At this point, this paper
assumes that an individual will work, eat, and drink only in his or her own county. It does
not take into account the ability of individuals to travel across county or state lines to areas
without smoking bans. Depending on the ease of such travel, it is possible that a county level
regulation would not affect certain individuals’ smoking habits, just their driving habits.
Finally, case studies and more disaggregated geographic identifications for individuals
in the study could be more effective at accounting for endogeneity. Because endogeneity is
apparent in the state-level variables and likely affected county-level measures of smoking
bans, matching respondents to policies on the municipality level could avoid some of these
problems. In the end, there is more to be learned about these bans as they continue to shape
the face of American tobacco control policy at all levels of government.
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Figure 1. Changes in Cigarette Consumption for Individuals with Different
Levels of Addiction Given an Increase in the Cost of Smoking in an Area with
a Ban
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Table 1. Sample Demographics
Mean
(Standard Deviation)
All No Ban Ban
Female 0.60 0.60 0.61
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
White 0.74 0.76 0.73
(0.44) (0.43) (0.45)
African-American 0.10 0.11 0.08
(0.30) (0.31) (0.27)
Hispanic (Non-White) 0.09 0.07 0.12
(0.29) (0.07) (0.32)
Other Race 0.07 0.02 0.08
(0.25) (0.02) (0.26)
Age 36.79 36.45 37.24
(8.33) (8.40) (8.20)
Single 0.38 0.39 0.36
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Child Present 0.62 0.61 0.64
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Drinker 0.59 0.59 0.60
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
New England 0.12 0.05 0.21
0.32 (0.21) (0.40)
Mid Atlantic 0.09 0.09 0.08
(0.28) (0.29) (0.27)
East-North Central 0.09 0.12 0.06
(0.29) (0.32) (0.24)
West-North Central 0.11 0.12 0.09
(0.31) (0.33) (0.28)
South Atlantic 0.19 0.23 0.14
(0.39) (0.42) (0.35)
East-South Central 0.06 0.08 0.02
(0.23) (0.27) (0.15)
West-South Central 0.08 0.11 0.05
(0.27) (0.31) (0.21)
Mountain 0.14 0.11 0.18
(0.35) (0.32) (0.39)
Pacific 0.12 0.08 0.17
(0.32) (0.28) (0.37)
Observations 964925 557018 407907
Notes: All variables except age are dummy
variables.
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Table 2. Sample Socioeconomic Characteristics
Mean
(Standard Deviation)
All No Ban Ban
HS Non-Graduate 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
HS Graduate 0.26 0.28 0.24
(0.44) (0.45) (0.43)
Some College 0.28 0.29 0.28
(0.45) (0.45) (0.44)
College Graduate 0.38 0.36 0.41
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49)
Income <$10,000 0.05 0.05 0.04
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
Income <$15,000 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
Income <$20,000 0.06 0.07 0.06
(0.24) (0.25) (0.23)
Income <$25,000 0.08 0.09 0.07
(0.27) (0.28) (0.26)
Income <$35,000 0.12 0.13 0.10
(0.32) (0.34) (0.30)
Income <$50,000 0.17 0.18 0.15
(0.37) (0.38) (0.36)
Income <$75,000 0.19 0.19 0.19
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
Income>$75,000 0.29 0.25 0.34
(0.45) (0.43) (0.47)
Employed 0.77 0.77 0.77
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
Observations 964925 557018 407907
Notes: All variables are dummy variables.
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Table 3. Sample Smoking Statistics
Mean
(Standard Deviation)
All No Ban Ban
Ever Smoked 0.42 0.44 0.40
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
Current Smoker 0.24 0.26 0.21
(0.43) (0.44) (0.40)
Occasional Smoker 0.06 0.60 0.60
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23)
Daily Smoker 0.28 0.29 0.15
0.38 (0.40) (0.36)
Attempt to Quit 0.57 0.57 0.59
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
Former Smoker 0.44 0.41 0.48
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Cigarette Price 4.41 4.31 4.55
(0.68) (0.59) (0.76)
State Funding 2.79 2.86 2.70
(2.80) (2.75) (2.87)
Alcohol Price 8.36 8.44 8.26
(0.46) (0.46) (0.45)
Bars Per Capita 0.19 0.20 0.15
(0.22) (0.23) (0.14)
Restaurants Per Capita 0.72 0.72 0.71
(0.41) (0.41) (0.39)
Notes: [1] 977,981 total individual observations, 564,614 not facing
bans, 413,367 facing bans. [2] Quit looks at current smokers (231,228
individuals) of whom 146060 are facing bans and 85,168 are not fac-
ing bans. [3] Former smoker looks individuals who had smoked in their
lifetime (408,498 individuals) of whom 246,134 live in an area without
a ban and 162,364 live in an area with a ban. [4] Smoking variables
are dummy variables. [5] 2,429 counties in the sample, 2,156 with-
out bans and 273 with bans. [6] Minimum cigarette price: $3.02 (area
with a ban); maximum cigarette price: $7.21 (area with and without
ban). [7] Minimum per capita tobacco control funding: $0.00; maxi-
mum per capita tobacco control funding: $15.34 (area without ban).
[8] Minimum alcohol price: $7.11 (area without a ban), Maximum al-
cohol price: $10.00 (area with a ban). [9] Minimum per capita bars
(county-level, per 1000 people): 0.00 (areas with and without bans);
maximum per capita bars: 1.70 (area without ban). [10] Minimum per
capita restaurants(county-level, per 1000 people): 0.00 (areas with and
without bans); maximum per capita bars: 4.48 (area without ban).
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Table 4. Ban Statistics
All Years 2001 2009
No Ban 0.59 0.90 0.25
(0.49) (0.39) (0.43)
County Work Ban 0.07 0.05 0.16
(0.25) (0.23) (0.37)
State Work Ban 0.23 0.00 0.45
(0.42) 0.00 (0.50)
County Bar Ban 0.07 0.03 0.11
(0.26) (0.18) (0.31)
State Bar Ban 0.25 0.02 0.54
(0.43) (0.16) (0.50)
County Restaurant Ban 0.08 0.04 0.13
(0.27) (0.20) (0.34)
State Restaurant Ban 0.31 0.05 0.59
(0.46) (0.22) (0.49)
All 3 Bans - County Level 0.05 0.02 0.10
(0.22) 0.15 (0.30)
All 3 Bans - State Level 0.16 0.00 0.39
(0.37) 0.00 (0.49)
Observations 977981 76483 119036
Notes: All variables are dummy variables.
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Table 5. Demographics of Non-Smokers and Current Smokers
Never Smoked Daily Smokers Occasional Smokers
Variable All No Ban Ban All No Ban Ban All No Ban Ban
Female 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.56
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
White 0.71 0.73 0.70 0.79 0.80 0.77 0.69 0.67 0.71
(0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.41) (0.40) (0.42) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45)
African American 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.12
(0.31) (0.34) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.26) (0.31) (0.28) (0.32)
Hispanic 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.10
(0.31) (0.28) (0.34) (0.23) (0.21) (0.27) (0.32) (0.36) (0.30)
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.18) (0.16) (0.21) (0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13)
American Indian 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Other Race 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17)
Age 36.26 35.89 36.73 37.00 36.70 37.54 35.42 35.97 35.05
(8.33) (8.38) (8.23) (8.49) (8.51) (8.41) (8.65) (8.51) (8.72)
Single 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.51
(0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Child Present 0.64 0.63 0.66 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.56
(0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Drinker 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.72 0.73 0.72
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45)
Observations 565959 316493 249466 172084 110338 110338 59755 23657 36098
Notes: All variables except age are dummy variables
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Table 6. Socioeconomic Characteristics of Non-Smokers and Current Smokers
Never Smoked Daily Smokers Occasional Smokers
Variable All No Ban Ban All No Ban Ban All No Ban Ban
HS Non Graduate 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30)
HS Graduate 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.31 0.31 0.30
(0.41) (0.42) (0.40) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
Some College 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32
(0.44) (0.45) (0.43) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47)
College Degree 0.46 0.44 0.49 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.27 0.27 0.29
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.36) (0.35) (0.37) (0.44) (0.44) (0.46)
Income <$10,000 0.04 0.04 6.29 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.19) (0.19) (1.96) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Income<$15,000 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.25) 0.25 (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Income<$20,000 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
(0.22) (0.23) (0.18) (0.30) (0.31) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.30)
Income <$25,000 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10
(0.26) (0.27) (0.22) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30)
Income <$35,000 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13
(0.31) (0.33) (0.25) (0.36) (0.37) (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.33)
Income <$50,000 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16
(0.37) (0.38) (0.29) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37)
Income <$75,000 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17
(0.40) (0.40) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Income>$75,000 0.33 0.29 0.38 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.24
(0.47) (0.45) (0.49) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34) (0.40) (0.38) (0.43)
Working 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.75
(0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
Observations 565959 316493 249466 172084 110338 110338 59755 23657 36098
Notes: All variables are dummy variables.
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Table 7. Demographic Characteristics of Smokers with Respect to Quitting
No Quit Attempt Quit Attempt Former Smokers
Variable All No Ban Ban All No Ban Ban All No Ban Ban
Sex 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.58
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
White 0.80 0.81 0.78 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.82 0.83 0.80
(0.40) (0.39) (0.41) (0.44) (0.43) (0.45) (0.39) (0.38) (0.40)
African American 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04
(0.26) (0.27) (0.24) (0.31) (0.32) (0.29) (0.22) (0.24) (0.20)
Hispanic 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.09
(0.24) (0.22) (0.28) (0.27) (0.25) (0.31) (0.26) (0.24) (0.29)
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15)
American Indian 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11)
Other Race 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
Age 37.53 37.25 38.04 35.90 35.57 36.45 38.69 38.43 39.02
(8.27) (8.30) (8.20) (8.70) (8.75) (8.60) (7.75) (7.89) (7.55)
Single 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.32 0.32 0.31
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46)
Child Present 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.64
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Drinker 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.67
(0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47)
Observations 98313 63420 34893 132915 82640 50275 180183 101685 78498
Notes: All variables except age are dummy variables.
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Table 8. Socioeconomic Characteristics of Smokers with Respect to Quitting
No Quit Attempt Quit Attempt Former Smokers
Variable All No Ban Ban All No Ban Ban All No Ban Ban
HS Non Graduate 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.06
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.26) (0.24) (0.23)
HS Graduate 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.26 0.29 0.25
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44)
Some College 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.29
(0.46) (0.45) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.25) (0.46) (0.46)
College Degree 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.38 0.34 0.39
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49)
Income <$10,000 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.21) (0.18) (0.17)
Income <$15,000 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) 0.25 (0.25) (0.25) (0.20) (0.18) (0.17)
Income <$20,000 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04
(0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21)
Income <$25,000 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06
(0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.28) (0.26) (0.24)
Income <$35,000 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.10
(0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.33) (0.33) (0.29)
Income <$50,000 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.16
(0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36) (0.37) (0.39) (0.36)
Income <$75,000 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.21
(0.37) (0.37) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.39) (0.41) (0.40)
Income >$75,000 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.28 0.28 0.37
(0.36) (0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.34) (0.39) (0.45) (0.45) (0.48)
Working 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.79 0.79 0.80
(0.44) (0.43) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40)
Observations 98313 63420 34893 132915 82640 50275 180183 101685 78498
Notes: All variables are dummy variables.
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Table 9. Regression Results for the Core Regression
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
County Work Ban -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.019 0.002
(1.444) (1.501) (0.556) (1.703) (0.308)
State Work Ban 0.009 0.014 0.022 0.054 0.000
(3.448)∗∗ (6.386)∗∗ (5.284)∗∗ (5.661)∗∗ (0.074)
Work Ban ∗ Employed 0.000 -0.005 -0.012 -0.028 0.003
(0.104) (2.985)∗∗ (3.335)∗∗ (3.403)∗∗ (0.677)
County Bar Ban -0.001 0.004 0.015 0.021 -0.004
(0.110) (1.121) (1.972)∗ (1.208) (0.424)
State Bar Ban 0.035 0.022 0.016 0.042 -0.027
(11.705)∗∗ (8.699)∗∗ (3.469)∗∗ (3.750)∗∗ (4.249)∗∗
Bar Ban ∗ Drinker -0.004 -0.009 -0.021 -0.044 0.006
(1.596) (5.087)∗∗ (6.105)∗∗ (5.275)∗∗ (1.216)
County Rest. Ban -0.005 -0.008 -0.013 -0.020 0.000
(1.278) (2.209)∗ (1.910) (1.246) (0.017)
State Rest. Ban -0.049 -0.033 -0.021 -0.050 0.019
(18.055)∗∗ (14.666)∗∗ (4.815)∗∗ (4.788)∗∗ (3.244)∗∗
Cigarette Price -0.014 -0.042 -0.074 -0.209 0.086
(2.368)∗ (8.378)∗∗ (7.823)∗∗ (9.440)∗∗ (6.934)∗∗
State Funding 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(1.794) (0.078) (1.767) (0.300) (1.808)
Alcohol Price -0.066 -0.010 0.041 0.122 -0.054
(9.919)∗∗ (1.890) (3.967)∗∗ (4.961)∗∗ (3.971)∗∗
Observations 964925 964925 404707 404707 227648
% Correctly Predicted 65.278 77.288 65.087 - 58.882
Notes: [1] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except smoking fre-
quency. [2] Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses [3] ∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗ sig-
nificant at 1%.
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Table 10. Regression Results for Demographic and Socioeconomic Controls
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
Female -0.03∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗
African-American -0.09∗∗ 0.04∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.19∗∗ 0.12∗∗
Hispanic -0.11∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.28∗∗ -0.18∗∗ 0.07∗∗
Asian/Pacific Islander -0.06∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗ -0.13∗∗ 0.06∗∗
Native American 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗ -0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.03∗∗
Other Race 0.03∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.04∗∗
Age 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗
Age Squared 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
Single 0.04∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.23∗∗ -0.02
Child Present -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.09∗∗ 0.04∗∗
HS Graduate -0.09∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.20∗∗ 0.01∗∗
Some College -0.16∗∗ -0.13∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.39∗∗ 0.05∗∗
College Graduate -0.32∗∗ -0.26∗∗ -0.28∗∗ -0.75∗∗ 0.06∗∗
Income<$15,000 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.01
Income<$20,000 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
Income <$25,000 -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.01∗∗
Income <$35,000 -0.05∗∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.13∗∗ -0.02∗∗
Income <$50,000 -0.08∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.20∗∗ -0.02∗∗
Income <$75,000 -0.11∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.15∗∗ -0.33∗∗ -0.03∗∗
Income>$75,000 -0.15∗∗ -0.15∗∗ -0.21∗∗ -0.49∗∗ -0.03∗∗
Employed -0.02 -0.02 -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.03∗∗
Drinker 0.14∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.11∗∗ -0.01∗∗
Notes: [1] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except smoking fre-
quency. [2] ∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 11. Pairwise Correlation Coefficients for Ban Variables
Any Ban County Ban State Ban
Work Bar Rest. Work Bar Rest. Work Bar
Any Bar Ban 0.67 - - - - - - -
Any Restaurant Ban 0.74 0.83 - - - - - -
County Work Ban 0.49 0.37 0.37 - - - - -
County Bar Ban 0.27 0.41 0.34 0.60 - - - -
County Restaurant Ban 0.28 0.32 0.39 0.64 0.88 - - -
State Work Ban 0.78 0.49 0.57 -0.17 -0.13 -0.14 - -
State Bar Ban 0.57 0.84 0.70 0.05 -0.15 -0.17 0.61 -
State Restaurant Ban 0.62 0.69 0.83 0.00 -0.17 -0.20 0.70 0.85




Table 12. Regression Results for Combined Bar and Restaurant Bans
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
County Work Ban 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.017 -0.001
(0.201) (0.452) (0.358) (1.524) (0.149)
State Work Ban 0.013 0.016 0.022 0.057 -0.001
(4.960)∗∗ (7.498)∗∗ (5.519)∗∗ (5.896)∗∗ (0.269)
Work Ban ∗ Employed -0.004 -0.008 -0.013 -0.030 0.004
(1.918) (4.334)∗∗ (3.617)∗∗ (3.687)∗∗ (0.944)
County Bar/Rest. Ban -0.022 -0.013 -0.005 -0.012 0.003
(7.353)∗∗ (5.484)∗∗ (1.105) (1.072) (0.493)
State Bar/Rest. Ban -0.038 -0.026 -0.012 -0.025 0.004
(15.919)∗∗ (12.883)∗∗ (2.991)∗∗ (2.695)∗∗ (0.702)
Bar/Rest. Ban ∗ Drinker 0.018 0.005 -0.013 -0.025 -0.001
(8.491)∗∗ (2.629)∗∗ (3.777)∗∗ (3.166)∗∗ (0.120)
Cigarette Price -0.011 -0.040 -0.073 -0.208 0.082
(1.779) (8.106)∗∗ (7.857)∗∗ (9.496)∗∗ (6.683)∗∗
State Funding 0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.004
(2.964)∗∗ (0.613) (1.705) (0.129) (2.313)∗
Alcohol Price -0.078 -0.016 0.041 0.118 -0.046
(11.754)∗∗ (2.868)∗∗ (3.961)∗∗ (4.881)∗∗ (3.450)∗∗
Observations 964925 964925 404707 404707 227648
% Correctly Predicted 65.270 77.297 65.095 - 58.879
Notes: [1] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except smoking frequency.
[2] Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses [3] ∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 13. Regression Results for Ban Combinations
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
CW 0.005 -0.002 -0.010 -0.055 0.014
(0.711) (0.362) (0.961) (2.164)* (0.966)
SW -0.012 -0.012 -0.015 -0.058 0.007
(2.737)** (3.295)** (2.162)* (3.522)** (0.829)
CB - 0.341 0.081 0.333 -
- (0.947) (0.228) (0.372) -
CR -0.012 -0.012 -0.015 -0.042 -0.011
(1.783) (2.176)* (1.398) (1.657) (0.781)
SR -0.072 -0.053 -0.053 -0.128 0.033
(19.640)** (17.950)** (8.373)** (8.595)** (3.947)**
CW + CR -0.004 -0.006 -0.010 -0.012 0.012
(0.726) (1.366) (1.118) (0.575) (1.049)
CB + CR -0.009 -0.006 0.001 0.002 0.006
(2.114)* (1.560) (0.184) (0.140) (0.620)
SW + CR -0.023 -0.023 -0.034 -0.094 -0.014
(1.635) (2.062)* (1.523) (1.792) (0.478)
SW + SR -0.026 -0.007 0.015 0.039 0.012
(7.879)** (2.696)** (2.862)** (3.145)** (1.790)
SB + SR -0.007 -0.010 -0.008 -0.029 -0.010
(2.249)* (3.599)** (1.662) (2.367)* (1.432)
All County Bans -0.009 -0.007 -0.002 -0.023 -0.005
(2.904)** (2.706)** (0.483) (2.033)* (0.807)
CW + SR + SB -0.027 -0.020 -0.007 -0.026 -0.006
(6.645)** (5.874)** (1.105) (1.633) (0.678)
SW + CB + SR -0.077 -0.028 0.032 0.083 0.032
(3.059)** (1.311) (0.730) (0.790) (0.548)
SW + CB + CR -0.013 -0.021 -0.030 -0.122 0.019
(0.478) (0.937) (0.678) (1.164) (0.310)
All State Bans -0.007 0.001 0.017 0.048 -0.007
(2.564)* (0.643) (4.017)** (4.893)** (1.325)
Continued on next page . . .
Notes: [1] C - county; S - state; W - work ban; B - bar ban; R - restaurant
ban. [2] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except smoking fre-




Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
Work Ban ∗ Employed 0.001 -0.005 -0.011 -0.026 0.003
(0.231) (2.640)** (3.166)** (3.168)** (0.704)
Bar Ban ∗ Drinker -0.003 -0.009 -0.022 -0.044 0.005
(1.534) (5.053)** (6.114)** (5.316)** (1.171)
Cigarette Price -0.018 -0.046 -0.079 -0.229 0.086
(2.893)** (8.929)** (8.107)** (9.978)** (6.693)**
State Funding 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.004
(2.285)* (0.904) (0.930) (0.775) (2.028)*
Alcohol Price -0.057 0.001 0.058 0.172 -0.057
(8.302)** (0.206) (5.466)** (6.869)** (4.101)**
Observations 964923 964925 404707 404707 227647
% Correctly Predicted 65.274 77.287 65.113 - 58.911
Notes: [1] C - county; S - state; W - work ban; B - bar ban; R - restaurant ban.
[2] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except smoking frequency. [2]
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses [3] ∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 14. Regression Results Controlling for Per Capita Bars and Restaurants
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
County Work Ban -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.021 0.002
(1.362) (1.521) (0.701) (1.882) (0.305)
State Work Ban 0.011 0.014 0.021 0.050 -0.001
(4.279)∗∗ (6.507)∗∗ (4.974)∗∗ (5.114)∗∗ (0.092)
Work Ban ∗ Employed -0.001 -0.006 -0.014 -0.032 0.004
(0.313) (3.579)∗∗ (4.056)∗∗ (4.029)∗∗ (0.841)
County Bar Ban 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.013 -0.002
-0.331 -1.048 -1.599 -0.743 -0.249
State Bar Ban 0.034 0.021 0.014 0.038 -0.025
(11.799)∗∗ (8.562)∗∗ (3.122)∗∗ (3.451)∗∗ (4.109)∗∗
Bar Ban ∗ D ∗ Bars/Cap. -0.042 -0.046 -0.080 -0.137 0.014
(3.690)∗∗ (4.882)∗∗ (4.524)∗∗ (3.264)∗∗ (0.603)
Bars/Capita 0.011 0.034 0.071 0.169 -0.013
(1.783) (7.032)∗∗ (7.789)∗∗ (7.930)∗∗ (1.089)
County Rest. Ban -0.040 -0.029 -0.031 -0.058 0.004
(7.069)∗∗ (6.348)∗∗ (3.364)∗∗ (2.691)∗∗ (0.357)
State Rest. Ban -0.084 -0.055 -0.041 -0.092 0.023
(17.529)∗∗ (14.159)∗∗ (5.268)∗∗ (5.100)∗∗ (2.294)∗
Rest. Ban ∗ Rest./Cap. 0.066 0.042 0.033 0.071 -0.008
(9.138)∗∗ (7.028)∗∗ (2.894)∗∗ (2.639)∗∗ (0.520)
Rest./Capita -0.007 -0.042 -0.094 -0.258 0.010
(1.324) (10.317)∗∗ (12.456)∗∗ (14.532)∗∗ (1.088)
Cigarette Price -0.016 -0.043 -0.076 -0.215 0.086
(2.677)∗∗ (8.660)∗∗ (8.027)∗∗ (9.672)∗∗ (6.936)∗∗
State Funding 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003
(1.001) (0.720) (2.024)∗ (0.404) (1.679)
Alcohol Price -0.065 -0.009 0.042 0.124 -0.054
(9.710)∗∗ (1.695) (4.058)∗∗ (5.060)∗∗ (3.982)∗∗
Observations 964925 964925 404707 404707 227648
% Correctly Predicted 65.275 77.288 65.125 - 58.872
Notes: [1] D - drinker; Cap - capita. [2] Marginal effects reported for all dependent vari-
ables except smoking frequency. [3] Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses [4] ∗ sig-
nificant at 5%, ∗∗ significant at 1% [5] The ban and interaction term variables are dummy
variables. [4] Per capita variables represent the log of the number of establishments per
1000 people.
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Table 15. Regression Results for Ban Combinations, Controlling for Bars
and Restaurants Per Capita
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
CW 0.005 -0.001 -0.009 -0.051 0.013
(0.798) (0.186) (0.823) (2.033)* (0.939)
SW -0.013 -0.013 -0.017 -0.062 0.008
(2.821)** (3.582)** (2.439)* (3.784)** (0.846)
CB - 0.344 0.080 0.327 -
- (0.956) (0.224) (0.366) -
CR -0.044 -0.032 -0.034 -0.083 -0.007
(5.833)** (5.303)** (2.728)** (2.889)** (0.426)
SR -0.102 -0.071 -0.072 -0.173 0.037
(19.619)** (17.488)** (8.173)** (8.327)** (3.193)**
CW + CR -0.038 -0.027 -0.028 -0.052 0.016
(5.750)** (5.052)** (2.584)** (2.053)* (1.120)
CB + CR -0.041 -0.028 -0.021 -0.050 0.012
(7.097)** (5.912)** (2.326)* (2.323)* (0.977)
SW + CR -0.054 -0.044 -0.055 -0.142 -0.011
(3.843)** (3.830)** (2.339)* (2.606)** (0.343)
SW + SR -0.058 -0.029 -0.005 -0.009 0.016
(11.596)** (7.121)** (0.637) (0.477) (1.535)
SB + SR -0.043 -0.032 -0.028 -0.071 -0.004
(8.391)** (7.662)** (3.436)** (3.664)** (0.378)
All County Bans -0.040 -0.028 -0.022 -0.068 0.001
(8.621)** (7.271)** (2.976)** (3.881)** (0.052)
CW + SR + SB -0.060 -0.042 -0.032 -0.084 0.000
(10.707)** (9.376)** (3.541)** (3.918)** (0.015)
SW + CB + SR -0.107 -0.048 0.014 0.036 0.038
(4.255)** (2.274)* (0.318) (0.339) (0.641)
SW + CB + CR -0.039 -0.040 -0.049 -0.172 0.024
(1.453) (1.762) (1.097) (1.625) (0.396)
All State Bans -0.038 -0.021 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
(8.322)** (5.494)** (0.646) (0.145) (0.160)
Continued on next page . . .
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Table 15: (continued)
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
Work Ban ∗ Employed 0.000 -0.006 -0.013 -0.030 0.004
(0.027) (3.198)** (3.847)** (3.755)** (0.863)
Bar Ban ∗ D ∗ Bars/Cap. -0.039 -0.046 -0.084 -0.155 0.011
(3.456)** (4.882)** (4.717)** (3.665)** (0.463)
Bars/Capita 0.012 0.035 0.072 0.171 -0.012
(2.080)* (7.260)** (7.847)** (7.989)** (1.060)
Rest. Ban∗ Rest./Cap. 0.064 0.041 0.033 0.074 -0.007
(8.762)** (6.763)** (2.879)** (2.731)** (0.480)
Rest./Capita -0.007 -0.042 -0.095 -0.259 0.011
(1.394) (10.372)** (12.474)** (14.547)** (1.116)
Cigarette Price -0.021 -0.049 -0.083 -0.238 0.086
(3.303)** (9.370)** (8.452)** (10.344)** (6.712)**
State Funding 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.003
(1.585) (0.286) (1.213) (0.611) (1.909)
Alcohol Price -0.055 0.003 0.059 0.174 -0.057
(7.989)** (0.455) (5.562)** (6.940)** (4.115)**
Observations 964923 964925 404707 404707 227647
% Correctly Predicted 65.26 77.295 65.15 - 58.921
Notes: [[1] C - county; S - state; W - work ban; B - bar ban; R - restaurant ban; D
- drinker; Cap - capita. [2] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except
smoking frequency. [2] Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses [3] ∗ significant at 5%,
∗∗ significant at 1%. [4] Per capita variables represent the log of the number of establish-
ments per 1000 people.
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Table 16. Regression Results for the Core Regression with State Fixed Effects
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
County Work Ban 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.004
(0.668) (0.943) (0.444) (0.059) (0.546)
State Work Ban 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.014 0.001
(1.000) (1.370) (0.450) (1.110) (0.210)
Work Ban ∗ Employed 0.000 -0.006 -0.012 -0.026 0.002
(0.041) (3.082)** (3.442)** (3.237)** (0.502)
County Bar Ban 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.009 0.003
(0.227) (0.508) (1.003) (0.520) (0.289)
State Bar Ban -0.015 -0.01 -0.004 -0.007 -0.017
(3.284)** (2.636)** (0.501) (0.426) (1.760)
Bar Ban ∗ Drinker -0.006 -0.011 -0.024 -0.05 0.007
(2.597)** (6.165)** (6.701)** (6.047)** (1.561)
County Rest. Ban -0.009 -0.009 -0.013 -0.024 -0.004
(1.999)* (2.505)* (1.756) (1.409) (0.384)
State Rest. Ban 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.024 0.006
(0.707) (1.258) (1.598) (1.419) (0.603)
Cigarette Price 0.003 -0.028 -0.064 -0.163 0.06
(0.285) (3.881)** (4.675)** (5.029)** (3.357)**
State Funding 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.011 -0.007
(1.622) (2.102)* (1.340) (2.432)* (2.803)**
Alcohol Price -0.004 0.012 0.029 0.093 -0.07
(0.227) (0.836) (1.068) (1.442) (1.959)
Observations 964925 964925 404707 404707 227648
% Correctly Predicted 65.317 77.299 65.175 - 58.989
Notes: [1] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except smoking fre-
quency. [2] Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses [3] ∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗ sig-
nificant at 1%.
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Table 17. Regression Results for Combined Bar and Restaurant Bans with
State Fixed Effects
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
County Work Ban 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.004
(0.823) (0.964) (0.393) (0.167) (0.602)
State Work Ban 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.013 0.000
(1.222) (1.455) (0.384) (1.061) (0.036)
Work Ban ∗ Employed -0.003 -0.008 -0.013 -0.029 0.003
(1.415) (4.162)** (3.760)** (3.536)** (0.741)
County Bar/Rest. Ban -0.017 -0.013 -0.009 -0.021 0.002
(5.262)** (4.762)** (1.707) (1.699) (0.251)
State Bar/Rest. Ban -0.018 -0.009 0.005 0.011 -0.004
(5.961)** (3.591)** (1.048) (0.935) (0.649)
Bar/Rest. Ban * Drinker 0.013 0.001 -0.014 -0.030 0.001
(6.017)** (0.666) (4.222)** (3.795)** (0.120)
Cigarette Price 0.000 -0.031 -0.067 -0.170 0.059
(0.046) (4.280)** (4.895)** (5.254)** (3.328)**
State Funding 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.011 -0.007
(1.488) (1.940) (1.261) (2.352)* (2.811)**
Alcohol Price -0.009 0.008 0.025 0.085 -0.075
(0.487) (0.576) (0.926) -1.326 (2.095)*
Observations 964925 964925 404707 404707 227648
% Correctly Predicted 65.313 77.293 65.162 - 58.997
Notes: [1] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except smoking frequency.
[2] Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses [3] ∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗ significant at 1%.
64
Table 18. Regression Results for Ban Combinations with State Fixed Effects
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
CW 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.026 0.011
(0.235) (0.089) (0.323) (1.022) (0.795)
SW 0.007 0.003 -0.004 0.004 -0.022
(1.160) (0.591) (0.365) (0.178) (1.811)
CB - 0.383 0.13 0.475
- (1.057) (0.374) (0.532)
CR -0.008 -0.009 -0.013 -0.032 -0.011
(1.162) (1.561) (1.162) (1.260) (0.787)
SR 0.006 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007
(1.215) (0.237) (0.141) (0.213) (0.613)
CW + CR -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 -0.01 0.008
(1.906) (1.621) (0.798) (0.451) (0.63)
CB + CR -0.008 -0.007 -0.004 -0.012 0.01
(1.665) (1.786) (0.548) (0.703) (1.073)
SW + CR 0.001 -0.008 -0.027 -0.06 -0.02
(0.035) (0.692) (1.141) (1.087) (0.627)
SW + SR 0.006 0.012 0.023 0.057 0.014
(1.044) (2.724)** (2.719)** (2.883)** (1.316)
SB + SR -0.012 -0.004 0.01 0.023 -0.017
(2.932)** (1.125) (1.668) (1.513) (1.984)*
All County Bans -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.017 -0.001
(1.685) (1.794) (0.635) (1.417) (0.134)
CW + SR + SB -0.007 0.001 0.015 0.026 -0.001
(1.039) (0.092) (1.412) (1.055) (0.103)
SW + CB + SR -0.057 -0.012 0.051 0.14 0.04
(2.204)* (0.536) (1.134) (1.306) (0.669)
SW + CB + CR 0.014 -0.003 -0.019 -0.075 0.01
(0.499) (0.112) (0.415) (0.702) (0.162)
All State Bans -0.008 -0.002 0.009 0.028 -0.009
(2.752)** (0.753) (1.942) (2.535)* (1.452)
Continued on next page . . .
Notes: [1] C - county; S - state; W - work ban; B - bar ban; R - restaurant
ban. [2] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except smoking
frequency. [2] Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses [3] ∗ significant at
5%, ∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 18 (continued)
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
Work Ban ∗ Employed 0 -0.006 -0.012 -0.026 0.002
(0.077) (3.098)** (3.451)** (3.235)** (0.499)
Bar Ban ∗ Drinker -0.006 -0.011 -0.024 -0.05 0.007
(2.589)** (6.146)** (6.677)** (6.017)** (1.547)
Cigarette Price 0.003 -0.028 -0.063 -0.162 0.061
(0.311) (3.795)** (4.599)** (4.983)** (3.417)**
State Funding 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.011 -0.007
(1.558) (2.099)* (1.383) (2.457)* (2.596)**
Alcohol Price -0.006 0.014 0.034 0.102 -0.065
(0.316) (0.925) (1.227) (1.577) (1.820)
Observations 964923 964925 404707 404707 227647
% Correctly Predicted 65.316 77.297 65.177 - 58.999
Notes: [1] C - county; S - state; W - work ban; B - bar ban; R - restaurant ban.
[2] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except smoking frequency. [2]
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses [3] ∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 19. Regression Results Controlling for Per Capita Bars and Restau-
rants with State Fixed Effects
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
County Work Ban 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.004
(0.669) (1.064) (0.585) (0.073) (0.538)
State Work Ban 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.018 0.001
(1.728) (2.079)∗ (0.999) (1.498) (0.085)
Work Ban ∗ Employed -0.001 -0.007 -0.015 -0.032 0.003
(0.236) (3.746)∗∗ (4.266)∗∗ (3.982)∗∗ (0.695)
County Bar Ban 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.004
(0.623) (0.534) (0.788) (0.252) (0.423)
State Bar Ban -0.014 -0.010 -0.007 -0.015 -0.015
(3.063)∗∗ (2.814)∗∗ (0.919) (0.873) (1.621)
Bar Ban ∗ D ∗ Bars/Capita -0.047 -0.053 -0.091 -0.175 0.026
(4.020)∗∗ (5.493)∗∗ (5.002)∗∗ (4.055)∗∗ (1.086)
Bars/Capita 0.066 0.071 0.092 0.219 -0.006
(8.684)∗∗ (11.409)∗∗ (7.809)∗∗ (7.944)∗∗ (0.401)
County Rest. Ban -0.032 -0.023 -0.026 -0.049 -0.004
(5.365)∗∗ (4.717)∗∗ (2.738)∗∗ (2.226)∗ (0.337)
State Rest. Ban -0.022 -0.010 -0.002 -0.002 0.005
(3.506)∗∗ (1.980)∗ (0.222) (0.071) (0.395)
Rest. Ban ∗ Rest./Capita 0.043 0.025 0.021 0.039 0.002
(5.803)∗∗ (4.036)∗∗ (1.803) (1.417) (0.100)
Rest./Capita -0.012 -0.040 -0.082 -0.222 0.003
(2.319)∗ (9.381)∗∗ (10.222)∗∗ (11.785)∗∗ (0.286)
Cigarette Price 0.002 -0.028 -0.064 -0.161 0.060
(0.204) (3.890)∗∗ (4.644)∗∗ (4.965)∗∗ (3.351)∗∗
State Funding 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.010 -0.007
(1.480) (1.821) (1.087) (2.177)∗ (2.783)∗∗
Alcohol Price 0.001 0.016 0.032 0.097 -0.070
(0.053) (1.080) (1.152) (1.506) (1.944)
Observations 964925 964925 404707 404707 227648
% Correctly Predicted 65.311 77.304 65.166 - 58.985
Notes: [1] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except smoking frequency.
[2] Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses [3] ∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗ significant at 1%
[4] The ban and interaction term variables are dummy variables. [4] Per capita variables
represent the log of the number of establishments per 1000 people.
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Table 20. Regression Results for Ban Combinations, Controlling for Bars
and Restaurants Per Capita with State Fixed Effects
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
CW 0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.031 0.012
(0.379) (0.063) (0.456) (1.191) (0.803)
SW 0.007 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.023
(1.140) (0.564) (0.357) (0.122) (1.863)
CB - 0.376 0.118 0.439 -
- (1.039) (0.338) (0.491) -
CR -0.030 -0.021 -0.024 -0.053 -0.012
(3.921)** (3.408)** (1.950) (1.836) (0.772)
SR -0.018 -0.013 -0.014 -0.028 -0.009
(2.667)** (2.318)* (1.262) (1.073) (0.590)
CW + CR -0.034 -0.021 -0.021 -0.037 0.006
(4.980)** (3.839)** (1.911) (1.424) (0.414)
CB + CR -0.029 -0.021 -0.020 -0.046 0.011
(4.960)** (4.321)** (2.131)* (2.049)* (0.847)
SW + CR -0.016 -0.015 -0.030 -0.065 -0.022
(1.018) (1.218) (1.241) (1.136) (0.695)
SW + SR -0.018 -0.002 0.012 0.036 0.012
(2.642)** (0.273) (1.092) (1.423) (0.871)
SB + SR -0.037 -0.020 -0.007 -0.012 -0.017
(6.254)** (4.087)** (0.748) (0.546) (1.332)
All County Bans -0.026 -0.018 -0.017 -0.044 -0.001
(5.399)** (4.413)** (2.156)* (2.395)* (0.080)
CW + SR + SB -0.031 -0.014 0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(4.071)** (2.213)* (0.003) (0.079) (0.093)
SW + CB + SR -0.068 -0.017 0.050 0.137 0.036
(2.625)** (0.730) (1.116) (1.262) (0.594)
SW + CB + CR 0.002 -0.008 -0.021 -0.083 0.007
(0.080) (0.323) (0.459) (0.766) (0.115)
All State Bans -0.029 -0.015 -0.004 0.001 -0.009
(6.032)** (3.737)** (0.532) (0.050) (0.921)
Continued on next page . . .
Notes: [1] C - county; S - state; W - work ban; B - bar ban; R - restaurant ban;
D - drinker; Cap. -capita. [2] Marginal effects reported for all dependent vari-
ables except smoking frequency. [3] Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
[4] ∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗ significant at 1%. [5] Per capita variables represent the
log of the number of establishments per 1000 people.
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Table 20 (continued)
Initiation Prevalence Continuation Frequency Cessation
Work Ban ∗ Employed -0.001 -0.007 -0.015 -0.032 0.003
(0.280) (3.776)** (4.283)** (3.989)** (0.694)
Bar Ban ∗ D ∗ Bars/Cap. -0.046 -0.053 -0.091 -0.174 0.024
(3.928)** (5.400)** (4.967)** (4.006)** (0.972)
Bars/Capita 0.067 0.071 0.092 0.218 -0.006
(8.683)** (11.407)** (7.805)** (7.914)** (0.389)
Rest. Ban ∗ Rest./Cap. 0.044 0.025 0.020 0.037 0.003
(5.823)** (3.987)** (1.746) (1.347) (0.203)
Rest./Capita -0.013 -0.040 -0.082 -0.221 0.003
(2.373)* (9.368)** (10.180)** (11.730)** (0.250)
Cigarette Price 0.002 -0.028 -0.063 -0.160 0.061
(0.208) (3.835)** (4.592)** (4.943)** (3.412)**
State Funding 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.010 -0.006
(1.468) (1.872) (1.173) (2.245)* (2.579)**
Alcohol Price 0.000 0.018 0.037 0.108 -0.065
(0.023) (1.203) (1.338) (1.671) (1.807)
Observations 964923 964925 404707 404707 227647
% Correctly Predicted 65.313 77.305 65.166 - 58.979
Notes: [1] C - county; S - state; W - work ban; B - bar ban; R - restaurant ban; D -
drinker; Cap. -capita. [2] Marginal effects reported for all dependent variables except
smoking frequency. [3] Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses [4] ∗ significant at 5%,
∗∗ significant at 1%. [5] Per capita variables represent the log of the number of establish-
ments per 1000 people.
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